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GENERAL A WATION SECURITY: A SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM MODEL
FOR COLLIGATE LEARNING
1

William B. Rankin, I1

Abstract
A well constructed plan-docheck-act (PDCA) tool, in the context of a Safety Management System (SMS), and
incorporating a structured field survey, can help students prepare for real-world problems, situations and crises in
general aviation (GA) security by providing an actual professional environment to study. Thus, through the
examination of an actual GA airport, students are given the opportunity to work issues through the trials, tribulations,
experiences, and research findings of others. In this paper all the elements of GA airport security plan are analyzed
at the collegiate level. It is suggested that this PDCA tool be implemented as a SMS model for the study of future
ahport security c o m e s used in the collegiate environment.
Introduction to General Aviation Security
Providing effective general aviation (GA) security
is a complex problem because of the size of an airport, the
diversity among users, and the unpredictable nature of
terrorism. A comprehensive SMS approach to all elements
of GA security is a goal to strive for while recognizing the
complexity of airport security programs. Title 49 Code of
Federal Regulations will continue to evolve as new
technologies and capabilities are developed; as will the
protocols for GA security measures to prevent terrorist acts
against the United States (Transportation Security
Administration, 2008)
According to the FAA (200) the background of SMS stems
fiom a systematic, proactive, and well-defined safety
program. A SMS approach:
... allows an organization producing a product or
service to strike a realistic and efficient balance
between safety and production. The forecast
growth in air transportation will require new
measures and a greater effort h m all aviation
producers-including airport operators-in order
to achieve a continuing improvement in the level
of aviation safety. The use of SMS at airports can
contribute to this effort by increasing the
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likelihood that airport operators will detect and
correct safety problems before those problems
result in an aircraft accident or incident. (7 1)
Role of the Transportation Security Administration
The Transportation SecurityAdministration(TSA)
is required to prescribe rules to protect persons and property
on aircra&against acts of criminal violence and aircraft
piracy, and to prescribe rules for weening passengers and
property for dangerous weapons, explosives, and destructive
substances. To cany out the provisions of the Aviation
Transportation and Security Act of 2001 (ATSA), the TSA
has adopted former FAA rules requiring airport operators,
air carriers, indirect air carriers, and foreign air carriers to
cany out various duties for civil aviation security. Title 49,
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), incorporates the
following Transportation Security Regulations (TSRs) that
concern aviation security: Part 1542 applies to certain
airport operators; Part 1544governs certain air carriers; Part
1546appliesto the operation of foreign air carriers; and Part
1548 applies to indirect air caniers such as bight
forwarders, who engage indirectly in air transportation of
property within the United States and sometimes operate out
of GA facilities (Quilly, 2005; Transportation Security
Administration, 2008).
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TSR Parts 1520,1540,1542 and 1548
Part 1520forbidsthe disclosure of informationthat
may compromise or be harmful to the safety and security of
the traveling public. Additionally, the regulation sets forth
the rules that allow the federal government to withhold
information from public disclosure even when requested
under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), in litigation,
or in rulemaking. Airport operators and air carriers are
required to restrict the availability of infomation contained
in security programs to those with a need-to-know. This
need-to-know is defined by the Airport Security Program.
Under this Part, airport management must withhold sensitive
security information (SSI) fiom unauthorized disclosure. If
SSI is released to unauthorized persons, the TSA must be
notified. Tbis permits the TSA to evaluatethe risk presented
by the release of the information, and to take whatever
actions may be needed to mitigate that risk (Quilty, 2005;
Transportation Security Administration, 2008).
New Part 1540 outlines the rules that apply to all
segments of civil aviation security and includes rules that
govern individuals and other persons. This regulation
applies both to individuals who work at the airport and to
the passengers using airports. Part 1540 also outlines
definitions and terms used in Parts 1542, 1548 and others.
For example, the widely used term escort is given a
definition within this regulation. Another significant
addition to the regulatory language is the inclusion of
individual accountability. The TSA believes that "the
contribution of individuals to the success of the civil
aviation security program cannot be over-emphasized," and
for that reason the "agency believes that holding individuals
accountable for their securityviolationswill serve as a direct
and effective corrective action and may prove to be a
positive deterrent7'(Quilty, 2005, p.8). The TSA believes
that by incorporating a level of individual responsibility in
tandem with existing airport security programs a higher
level of aviation security integrity will be ensured (Quilty,
2005)
The TSRs contain general requirements for
promoting civil aviation security. Each airport operator, air
carrier, foreign air carrier, and indirect air carrier covered by
these parts is required to have a security program that
contains information that specifies how they will perfom
their regulatory and statutory responsibilities. Again, all
these security programs are available only to those persons
having a need-to-know (Quilty, 2005; Transportation
Security Administration, 2008)
TSR Part 1542Airport Security prescribesrules for
airport operators servicing and facilitating U.S. certificated
air carriers, foreign air carriers, and both foreign and

domestic air cargo carriers. The purpose of Part 1542 is to
prevent any act of unlawful interference with the safety of
persons and goods in air transportation. To accomplish this
goal, the TSA has extended its security regulations to
airports as the first practical line of defense (Quilty, 2005;
Transportation Security Administration, 2008)
The TSA's congressionally authorized area of
jurisdiction and responsibilityfocuses on protecting persons
and property in air transportation against acts of criminal
violence, air piracy, and terrorism. However, to effect
security of aircI.aft in-flight, the TSA extends security
measures to the airport operator by requiring airport
management to regulate the movement of persons and
vehicles having access to all aircraft while on the ground
and within the airport boundary. In all respects, the security
of civil aviation operations begins at an airport's perimeter
fence and terminal building interface (Quilty, 2005;
Transportation Security Administration, 2008)
Part 1548, indirect air carrier security pmgram,
covers security procedures for cargo that are accepted for
transport on aircraft. In general, indirect air carriers are
required to carry out security procedures for handling cargo
that will be carried on aircraft(QuiIty, 2005; Transportation
Security Administration, 2008)
Aviation Security Advisory Committee
Recognizingthe need for tighter GA security at the
nation's airports to pmtect against terrorist threats,
vandalism, and other illegal acts on aviation, in April 2003
the TSA requested the Aviation Security Advisory
Committee (ASAC) of general aviation professional trade
associations such as the Aimaft Owners and Pilots
Association (AOPA), National Business Aircraft
Association (NBAA), and American Association of Airport
Executives (AAAE), etc. to establish a working group made
up of industry stakeholders to develop guidelines for
security enhancements for GA operations and airports. The
working group consisted of the trade associations, airport
operators, and state and federal government representatives.
Members of the working group engaged in
extensive meetings to review GA airport security
recommendations and to develop a list of GA bestpractices.
As a result, a list of best practices was designed to establish
non-regulatory standards for GA operations and security.
The primary purpose was to assist GA operators in the
prevention of terrorist acts using GA aircraft against the
United States. (Transportation Security Administration,
2006)
On November 17,2003, the ASAC communicated
their recommendations to TSA. TSA usedthis document as
a baseline fiom which to draft a document titled Security
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Guidelinesfor General Aviation Airports. This document
was intended to provide GA airport owners, operators, and
users with the guidelines concepts, technology, and
enhancements to secure aircraft and facilities, as well as
mitigate terrorist activities (Transportation Security
Administration, 2006).
Based on the list of GA best practices
recommended by the ASAC, students could use the survey
instrument below to study GA security at a local airport.
Students would first need to obtain the permission fiom a
local airport operatorto surveytheir airport securityposture.
In the case of several universities with aviatibn programs,
such as the University of Central Missouri, this may include
a university owned GA airport.
General Aviation Security Survey
According to the Transportation Security
Administration (2006) a number of issues should be
addressed by the owners/operators ofGA airports. The main
purpose of this survey is to establish the operational status
of airport security in relation to the operational
recommendations of the ASAC. The resulting survey report
will comprise three parts:
1. Fact-finding Survey,
2. Gap Analysis, and
3. Risk Assessment
The fact-fmding part displays compliance or noncompliance covering the relevant security areas. Factfinding survey results will form the basis for the gap
analysis and risk assessment against standards and
recommended ASAC guideline. For purposes of this model,
the following survey is proposed for student leamers:
Personnel
Passengers
1. Do the Pilots-in-Command of GA
aircraft ensure that the identity of all
occupants is verified, that all occupants
are aboard at the invitation of the pilot,
and that all baggage and cargo is h o w n
to the occupants?
Pilots
2. Do pilots using the airport (excluding
transient pilots) have governmentissued photo identification?
Student Pilots
3. Do aircraft owners control aircraft
ignition keys so that the student pilots
cannot start aircraftuntil instructors are
ready for a flight to begin? Or, do
student pilots have limited access to
aircraft keys until the student pilots
JAAER, Winter 2010
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have reached an appropriate point in
their training curriculum?
4. Do student pilots check-in with a
specific employee (i-e. dispatcher,
aircraft scheduler, flight instructor, or
other "management" official) before
being allowed accessto parked aircraft?
5. Do student pilots sign or initial a form
then not receive keys until an instructor
or other "management official" also
signs or initials?
Flight Schools and Aircraj? Renters
1. Does the schooVrenter require the
identity of all individuals renting an
aircraft to be verified by checking a
govemment-issued photo ID as well as
the airman certificate and current
medical certificate (if necessary for that
operation)?
2. In addition to any aircraft-specific
operational and training requirements,
are first-time rental customers asked to
familiarize themselves with local
airport operations, including security
procedures used at the GA facility?
3. Do operators renting aircraft look for
suspicious activities and report these
activities to appropriate officials? This
applies to individualsthat inquire about
aircraft rental without possessing the
necessary knowledge or certificationsto
operate such aircraft.
Transient Pilots
1. Are there sign-infsign-out procedures
for all transient operators identifying
where their parked is aircraft?
Aircraft
Securing Aircraft
2. Are pilots directed to make it as
difficult as possible for an unauthorized
person to gain access to their airplane?
This would include using existing
mechanisms such as door locks, keyed
ignitions, hangaring aircraft or using an
auxiliary lock to further protect aircraft
from unauthorized use. Commercially
available options for auxiliary locks
include locks for propellers, throttle,
and prop controls, and tie-downs. Are
hangar doors locked to prevent
Page 37
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unauthorized access or tampering with
the aircraft is important?
AirportdFaci1ities
Airport VehicleAccess
3. Is vehicle access restricted to facilities
and ramps? Are there signage, fencing,
gates andlor other positive control
techniques in place? This must include
restricting access to the airside to as
few locations as possible, balancing the
need for authorized access with access
I
control.
4. Where there is access control, is it
periodically reviewed for access
authorization -- including codes, cards
and locks -- to vehicular and pedestrian
gates leading to airside?
Lighting
1. Are outdoor areas lighted to help
improve the security of (a) aircraft
parking and hangar areas; (b) fuel
storage areas, (c) airport access points;
and other appropriate areas? Are
proximity sensors used?
Hangars
2.

Are hangarlpersonnel doors secured
when unattended?

Signage
3. Is appropriate signage posted?
Wording may include -- but is not
limited to -- warnings against
trespassing, unauthorized use of aircraft
and tampering with aircraft as well as
reporting of suspicious activity. Does
signage include phone numbers of the
nearest responding law enforcement
agency, 9-1-1, or TSA's 1-866GASECURE, whichever is appropriate?
Surveillance
Airport Community Watch Program
1. Is there an established
Airport Watch Program
in effect?
2. Is there a Aircraft Owners
and Pilots Association
Airport Watch Program
in effect?
Law Enforcement
Support
1. Have procedures been developed by the

weer
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airport operator to have security patrols
for ramp, aircraft hangars, and parking
areas?

2.

Has the airport operator communicated
and educated local law enforcement
agencies on security procedures at the
airport? This should include include:
What does a pilot license look like; who
is authorized to drive on the ramp; how
do you get airport access (who has
key); and what are "normal"
operations?

Security Plans and Communications
Security Plan
1. Is there an emergency locator map at
the airport? Does it identify gates,
hydrants, emergency shelters, buildings
and hazardous materials sites on a grid
map? Is a copy of this map provided to
fire and law enforcement agencies? Are
procedures established for handling
bomb threats and suspect aircraft?
Threat CommunicationSystem
2. Has the airport operator developed a
tiered comprehensive local phone and
contact list and distribute on a need-toknow basis. Include the following 24hour phone numbers on the contact list.
3. Does the airport operator have radio
communication capabilities with local
law enforcement?
4. Are the TSA and industry best practices
posted on the airports web site and
relate information about securing
aircraft and airport facilities?
5. Are security courses available h m
industry identified on the airport
operators web site? This should include
those fiom the American Association of
Airport Executives, Aircraft Owners
and Pilots Association, Experimental
Aircraft Association, and National Air
Transportation Association.
6. Does the airport operator communicate
all new securitypolicies and procedures
to airport tenants and the flying public
when issued by the TSA?
7. Does the airport operator conduct
regular meetings with airport tenants
JAAER, Winter 2010
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and the flying public to discuss the
security issues and challenges?
8. Does the airport operator have a
qualified, single Point-of-Contact
(POC) for disseminating security
information?
Specialty Operations
Agricultural AircrgF Operations
1. Does the airport operator direct each
ownerloperator of agricultural aircraft
to take appropriate steps to secure the
a i d when unattended? Examples of
existing mechanisms include throttle
and control locks, propeller locks and
hidden ignition switches. When storing
aircraft, does the ahport operator
recommend that aircraft be stored in
hangars with steel doors that are locked
with electronic security systems? When
-hangers are not available for storage,
does the airport operator recommend
that heavy equipment be parked in the
h n t and back of agricultural aircraft
when not in use? (pp. 8- 19)
Safety Risk Management
According to the FAA (2007), safety risk
management (SRM) "... is a fundamental component of
SMS. To be truly effective a SMS must have a formal risk
assessment program that identifies and documents hazards
on the airport" (p. 9). The FAA (2007) fiuther states that an
SRM:
determines associated risk(s)
identifies the severity and
probability of the occurring risk(s)
develops mitigation strategies as
appropriate
applies, tracks, and monitors the
mitigation strategy

necessary
A hazard is a condition, object or
activity with the potential for
causing damage, loss, or injury. A
risk is the chance of loss or injury
measured in terms of severity and
probability. (p. 9)
The PDCA Cycle
A plan-do-check-act (PDCA) cycle can be used
effectively to implement the SRM. The PDCA cycle is a
widely-known and very popular tool; in facf the Airports
Council International has endorsed this classic tool in its
education and deployment strategy (see http://www.acisafetynetwork.aerol). The PDCA cycle was developed by
Dr. Walter Shewharf and made popular by Dr. Edwards
Deming, considered the father of modem quality control.
PDCA should be thought of as a continuous cycle,
repeating as quickly as possible, in upward spirals that
converge on the ultimate goal. The cycle accounts for
limitations in knowledge and skills as well as the
subsequent increase in knowledge as you work your way
through the process, providing rapid improvement. The
PDCA cycle is an iterative four-step quality control
process. The elements include: a) plan, b) do, c) check,
and d) act. In the context of SMS, the cycle should be
thought of as a cycle within a system of cycles that makes
up a security management system (Dartmouth College,
n.d.). The power of this method is simplicity as it is very
easy to comprehend as follows:
1. Plan Establish the objectives and
processes necessary to identify and
deliver the stated security objectives.
2. Do - Implement the processes to cany
out the plan.
3. Check - Monitor and evaluate the
processes and results against the stated
objectives and report the outcomes.
4. Act - Apply actions to the outcomes
for necessary improvements and/or
corrections. This means reviewing all
steps (Plan, Do, Check, Act) and
modifying the process to improve the
results before its next implementation
(see figure 1 below).

-

assesses and modifies strategies as
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Figure I. The PDCA Cycle

Using the survey and the PDCA Cycle to Identi@the Gap
Using the airport survey, several site visits and the PDCA
cycle, learners can perform a risk assessment and a gap
analysisto identify the gap between the o~timizedsecurity
outcomes recommended by the ASAC and the integration
of these outcomes by the airport operator at the airport
studied. This helps provide students with insight into areas
that have room for improvement. The gap analysis process
involves determining, documenting and approving the
variance between recommended ASAC securitymeasures
and the risk assessment and current capabilities at the
airport studied (Dartmouth College, n.d.).
Risk Assessment
Learners can then use the risk assessment criteria of
AC 1501552-37 to assess the security risk. The risk
levels used in the FAA (2007) matrix are defmed as:
1. High risk - Unacceptable level of risk: The
security measure should not be
implemented or the activity continued
unless hazards are further mitigated so that
risk is reduced to medium or low level.
Tracking and management involvement
are required, and management must
approve any proposed mitigating controls.
Catastrophic hazards are caused by:
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a.
b.
c.

single-point events or hilures
common-cause events or failures
undetectable latent events in
combination with single point or
common cause events are
considered high risk, even if
extremely remote
2. Medium risk - Acceptable level of risk:
Minimum acceptable safety objective;
the security measure may be
implemented or the activity can
continue, but tracking and management
are required.
3. Low risk - Target level of risk: Acceptable
without restriction or limitation; the identified
hazards are not required to be actively managed
but are documented.
Hazards are ranked according to the severity and the
likelihood of their risk, which is illustrated by where
they fall on the risk matrix. Hazards with high risk
receive higher priority for treatment and mitigation. (
P- 11)
The risk assessments are based on the risk
assessment in table 1 below.
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'Table I

Note. Source: (FAA. 2007)

Student Recommendations
Gap snaiysis naturally flows fn)m benchmarking
and other assessments. Once the general expectations of
performance in security are understood, it is possible for
students to compare those expectations with the level of
prformrmce at which the airport currently functions. The
cornparisun of the risk assessment lo the level of the
security measures identified in the survey instnunen1
forms the gap analysis, which is the basis far learner
recommcttdations at the conclusion of tire exercise (FAA,
2007).
C~nclusian

(iencral aviatiot~security is a complex pmblem
hccausc of thc diversity among aircmfi types, airpor?~,and
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GA operational considcrations as welt as the unprcdictablc
nature of rerrc)rism.Much wlnerability evivts a1 airprms that
ean be exploited. This model provides students with a

comprehensive approach to unkfstanding and using the
elements of (iA airport security. It alw provides
inf'nrmatttioil necessary tcl recognize the complexity of good
GA airport security programs. The TSKs and C;A airport
wurity will continue to evolve as new technoiogies and
capabilities are developed. t'mlocois Z'or new security
processes will be dceelitped and implemented at (iA
faciiities. 'thc knowledge s f same of these pmtacols and
new CiA airport security p r w e w s can be gain4 by use of
this model it1 colligate learning.+
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